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FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE ATTACKS ON
CLASS ACTIONS
Joanne Doroshow*
February 9th, 2017 began one of most shameful periods of
legislative malpractice that I can remember in my thirty years
working on civil justice issues. That evening, we became aware of
a massive, new piece of legislation that was haphazardly written
by corporate lobbyists, and would completely alter class action law
in the United States. Although not yet formally introduced, the
legislation was already scheduled to be marked-up and voted on
by the House Judiciary Committee within the week. The
Committee would vote without holding a single legislative hearing,
despite the fact that the bill would create massive confusion while
completely upending well-established law. The bill would also
directly interfere with the deliberative work of the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which had
just gone through a painstaking process considering and making
changes to class action rules that were supported by both plaintiff
and defense representatives; these changes were set to go into effect
in December 2018. 1
This bill was eventually identified as H.R. 985, the Fairness
in Class Action Litigation Act. It would largely fulfil a dream that
major corporate lobby groups have had since the 1970s - getting
rid of class actions in America. 2
*Founder and Executive Director, Center for Justice and Democracy. Cofounder, Americans for Insurance Reform. J.D., Temple University; B.A.,
University of Rochester.
1
See, e.g., Niki Mendoza, Changes To Rule 23 Are Coming, Are You
Prepared?, LAW360, March 16, 2018.
2
See generally STEPHEN A. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL
LITIGATION (2017) [herinafter Burbank]; Letter from Howard M. Erichson,
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, to Hon. Paul Ryan,
Speaker, et al. (Feb.18, 2017) (as soon as the bill was introduced, legal experts
began critiquing it. Fordham Law Professor Howard Erichson wrote to the
committee that the legislation was “slapped together without any nuanced

22
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THE HISTORY OF CLASS ACTIONS
Before examining how and why certain lobby groups want
to destroy class actions, it is crucial to understand the process by
which class actions were created, the rationale underlying the
creation, and the significance of such proceedings. Despite what
some may think, class actions were not the invention of the U.S.
plaintiffs’ bar. In fact, legal historians assert class actions are
rooted in 17th century English law. 3 Even before the 17th century,
however, there was an English tradition of bringing complaints of
communal harm in organized groups. 4 In their book Rights and
Retrenchment, The Counterrevolution against Federal Litigation,
Stephen B. Burbank and Sean Farhang write, “[p]rior to the
Federal Rules[,] class actions were permitted in a limited set of
circumstances marked out by the practice of courts of equity in
England. 5
In the early part of the 20th Century, growing
industrialization and the mass accumulation of capital by
corporations was starting to lead to inequality between the “two
classes of legal persons - corporate and human - that the law
presumes are, and treats as, equals.” 6 The perceived need to level
the playing field between these two classes was accomplished by
allowing people to file claims collectively. 7 As litigators Elizabeth
J. Cabraser and Michael D. Hausfeld write,
The class action was perceived as the procedural
mechanism that would restore, to individuals, the
practical ability to pursue redress of corporate
wrongdoing, would provide cost-effective access to
the courts, and would enable civil justice to be done
understanding of the law of class actions or MDL.. . . [T]he bill looks like a wish
list for corporate defendants”); Letter from Myriam Gilles, Vice Dean, Cardozo
School of Law, to James J. Park, Chief Counsel, Democratic Staff (Feb.13, 2017)
(Cardozo School of Law professor Myriam Gilles wrote that the bill would
“radically restrict access to justice for injured consumers, employees and small
businesses by, among other things, imposing requirements upon class plaintiff
that are both unrealistic and unnecessary.”).
3
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 10 (2000).
4
Id.
5
BURBANK, supra note 2, at 72.
6
Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Michael D. Hausfeld, The Necessity of Class
Actions in a Global Economy, Paper presented at the National Institute on Class
Actions C-26 (1997).
7

Id.
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between adversaries of otherwise unequal economic
means and bargaining power.
Class actions were thus a self-consciously corrective
measure, borrowed from equity and applied to suits
at civil law, and employed to counteract the
tendency of economic power to grant practical
immunity. In modern American society, where all
persons are equal, it was perceived that a civil
justice system that did not adjust to correct the
prejudicial ramifications of the inequality between
company and individual, actively promoted
injustice.
In 1938, the United States adopted the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) which codified the class action device in
Rule 23. 8 Eventually, class actions became one of the most
powerful mechanisms to secure justice in America. For example,
Brown v. Board of Education, which outlawed school segregation
and set the stage for the entire civil rights movement, was a class
action lawsuit. 9
In the 1960s, a new Advisory Committee was appointed to
look at the FRCP to “turn federal jurisprudence from abstract
inquiries to functional analysis that considered the practical effects
of litigation.” 10 In 1966, the Supreme Court issued a new version of
Rule 23, including Rule 23(a) that specified “four requirements
applicable to all litigation if it was to proceed as a class actions,
colloquially called numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation.” 11 The new Rule 23 “reformulated the
categories appropriate for class action treatment and specified
different procedural requirements depending on the category.” 12

UNITED STATES COURTS, CURRENT RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current-rules-practiceprocedure (“The rules were first adopted by order of the Supreme Court on
December 20, 1937, transmitted to Congress on January 3, 1938, and effective
September 16, 1938”); see FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
9
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
10
BURBANK, supra note 2, at 72.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 72-3.
8
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THE IMPORTANCE OF CLASS ACTIONS
The Center for Justice & Democracy (CJ&D), the national
consumer rights organization that I founded and run, has produced
two studies that compile recent important class actions that have
compensated victims and protected individuals and businesses
from a wide array of abuses. 13
CJ&D’s studies show
overwhelming evidence that class actions have helped victims of
corporate law-breaking and led to changes in corporate behavior
that protect all consumers. 14
When Wells Fargo charged illegal fees and ruined its
customers’credit, for example, class actions helped remedy the
fraud for many customers. 15 Class actions have compensated many
small businesses when they were forced to pay price-fixed
overcharges, allowing them to recover their stolen money. 16
Other class actions have remedied discriminatory practices,
including for #MeToo survivors of sexual harassment, abuse and
discrimination in the workplace. 17 For many individuals
See Center for Justice & Democracy, First Class Relief: How Class
Actions Benefit Those Who Are Injured, Defrauded and Violated (Oct. 15,
13

2014),
http://centerjd.org/content/first-class-relief-how-class-actions-benefitthose-who-are-injured-defrauded-and-violated.
14
Id.
15
See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FORCED ARBITRATION AND
WELLS FARGO: THE CFPB’S RULE PROTECTS VICTIMS OF BANK FRAUD,
https://www.nclc.org/issues/forced-arbitration-and-wells-fargo.html.
16
In one recent case, for example, Dow Chemical agreed to an $835 million
class action settlement – the largest ever recovered in a price-fixing case from a
single defendant – on behalf of roughly 2,200 furniture, roofing material,
appliance and other product manufacturers who were victims of a polyurethane
price-fixing scheme. See In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 041616-JWL, 2016 WL
4060156, at *1,3,5 (D. Kan. July 29, 2016); see also, Margaret Cronin Fisk, Dow
Loses $1.2 Billion Verdict as Top 2013 Award, BLOOMBERG (January 14, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-14/dow-loses-1-2-billionverdict-as-top-2013-award; URETHANE ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
http://polyetherpolyolsettlement.com/docs/notice.pdf; Settlement Agreement, In
re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 041616-JWL, 2016 WL 4060156, at *1,3,5 (D. Kan.
July 29, 2016); In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014).
17
In 2016, for example, Valeant settled with 225 female sales
representatives who had been subjected to “unwelcome sexually-charged
‘jokes’ and commentary, name-calling, and offensive stereotypical comments
about women, pregnancy, and caregiving,” expected to drink alcohol, socialize
with and tolerate sexual advances from co-workers, denied promotions and paid
less than their male counterparts. Medicis/Valeant agreed to pay class members
$7.15 million and institute extensive new company training and protocols as well
as fairer compensation and promotion processes. Final Approval of Class
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experiencing discrimination filing an individual suit, as opposed to
joining a class action, is an unrealistic option. First, class actions
may be the only way to prove or remedy systemic discrimination.
As explained by the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc. (LDF) in its Amicus Brief submitted to the U.S. Supreme
Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, “[w]ithout a broad
discovery of company-wide statistical and other data that class
actions facilitate, it is difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to prove a
pervasive pattern and practice of discrimination.” 18 Second, it is
extremely expensive to prove institutional discrimination without
class actions. As noted by LDF,
In many civil rights cases, most, if not all, pertinent
information is within the exclusive province of the
defendant—through its agents, employees, records,
Settlement, Brown v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., No. 1:13-cv-01345 (July
11,
2016),
http://medicisgendersettlement.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/52-Order-Granting-Final-Approval-of-the-ClassSettlement.pdf; see also Modified Settlement Agreement, Brown v. Medicis
Pharmaceutical
Corp.,
No.
1:13-cv-01345
(Jan.
14,
2015),
http://medicisgendersettlement.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/FullyExecuted-Modified-Settlement-Agreement-1-14-15-FINAL.pdf; Class Action
Complaint, Brown v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., No. 1:13-cv-01345 (Sept.
5,
2013),
http://medicisgendersettlement.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/1-Complaint.pdf. That same year, BAE Systems
Norfolk Ship Repair settled with female shipyard workers for horribly
discriminatory practices, which in addition to relegating women to lower-level
jobs and denying promotions, also created a work environment where managers
and supervisors often “shared or displayed sexual photographs at work while
making sexual comments,” “frequently and regularly us[ed] the words ‘bitch’
and ‘whore’ to refer to women, and discuss what they did sexually with women,
including graphic descriptions of sex acts.” Victims who spoke out faced
retaliation and termination. BAE agreed to $3 million in class relief as well as to
“changes in workplace policies and procedures, including the implementation of
relief addressing BAE’s hiring, promotion, training, and complaint
investigation process.” Victims who spoke out faced retaliation and termination.
BAE agreed to $3 million in class relief as well as to “changes in workplace
policies and procedures, including the implementation of relief addressing
BAE’s hiring, promotion, training, and complaint investigation process.” Class
Action Settlement, Aviles v. BAE Sys. Norfolk Ship Repair, No. 2:13-cv-00418
(Feb. 10, 2016).; see also Matthew Bultman, BAE Systems To Pay $4.6M In
(Feb.
10,
2016),
Gender
Discrimination
Row,
http://www.law360.com/articles/757931/bae-systems-to-pay-4-6m-in-genderdiscrimination-row; Complaint, Aviles v. BAE Sys. Norfolk Ship Repair, 2013
WL 11330973 (E.D.Va.).
18
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 2010 WL 3934619, at 19 (9th Cir.
2010).
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and documents. Discovery of this evidence—
especially in challenges to institution-wide practices
of large corporate defendants—is expensive; thus,
the ability to spread the costs over a class is key to
obtaining redress. 19

CLASS ACTIONS, FORCED ARBITRATION, AND THE
FEDERAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU
In recent years, companies have inserted pre-dispute forced
arbitration clauses and class action waivers in employment and
consumer contracts, requiring harmed individuals to resolve
disputes in rigged arbitration systems. 20 The U.S. Supreme Court
has recently endorsed corporate use of such contracts. In the 2011
decision AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court allowed
culpable companies to unilaterally ban class actions against them
via forced arbitration clauses for the first time. 21 The Court stated
that the class action ban was legal even though California law,
where the case was brought, dictated that class action bans were
“unconscionable” and could not be imposed. 22
AT&T v. Concepcion initiated a trend towards corporate
deference in forced arbitration disputes that was further applied in
American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant. 23 The case
involved an antitrust class action suit brought by Alan Carlson,
longtime owner of Italian Colors restaurant in Oakland,
California. Italian Colors is a successful restaurant, but like most
local restaurants, its profit margins are slim. 24 A significant
Id.
See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration
Everywhere, Stacking Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2015,
19
20

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitrationeverywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html; see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg
and Michael Corkery, A Privatization Of the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitrationa-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html.
21
AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
22
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 153 (2005) abrogated
by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
23
Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2307 (2013).

See The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Undermine the Rights of Consumers, Workers and
24
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portion of the restaurant’s earnings came from customers who
used American Express cards. Mr. Carlson’s restaurant could not
survive if he refused to accept these card payments. But American
Express’s standard merchant contracts required restaurants
accepting any American Express card to accept all types of
American Express cards, including cards that carried extremely
high fees. The higher fees hurt Mr. Carlson’s business, and
believing this practice violated antitrust laws, he filed a class
action lawsuit against American Express on behalf of other small
businesses like his own.
The Court dismissed the class action, upholding the forced
arbitration clause and class action waiver in American Express’s
standard merchant contract. It found such clauses valid even
where they prevented an injured party from vindicating important
rights guaranteed to them by other federal laws. Mr. Carlson was
then left with a terrible choice: pursing a complex and costly-toprove antitrust case in a private arbitration system alone, or giving
up and continuing to accept high-fee cards. 25 He decided to give
up. 26
Even before these court decisions, Congress was concerned
with the spread of forced arbitration clauses and class action
waivers. When it enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act in 2010, 27 it instructed the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to study the forced
arbitration clauses being used in consumer financial products or
services. 28 In March 2015, the CFPB produced an extraordinary
700-page study finding that class actions deliver cash relief to
vastly more consumers – especially those with small dollar claims
– than individual arbitration. 29
Small Businesses?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.

(2013)
(testimony
of
Alan
Carlson),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-1713CarlsonTestimony.pdf.
25
Respondent’s Brief, American Express Co. v. Italian Rest., 2013 WL
267025 at 7 (2013).
26
Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
31,
2015,
Stacking
Deck
of
Justice,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitrationeverywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html.
27
15 U.S.C. § 78o.
28
12 U.S.C. § 5518.
29
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROT. BUREAU, Arbitration Study: Report to

Congress, pursuant to Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Mar.
10,
2015,
Protection
Act
§
1028(a),
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It was no surprise that the CFPB study was attacked by
banks and lenders who asserted the study proves that consumers
on average receive greater relief in arbitration ($5,389) than class
action lawsuits ($32). 30 The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) found
the claim to be “enormously misleading” because consumers only
win relief in nine percent of arbitration disputes. 31 What is far
more typical is that the company fights consumers in arbitration
with claims and counterclaims. 32 In those situations, arbitrators
grant the companies relief ninty-three percent of the time, and then
order the consumer to pay the bank. So considering “both sides of
this equation,” in arbitration, the average consumer is actually
paying $7,725 to the bank. 33
EPI also examined whether arbitration was cheaper and
faster than class actions. They found that while consumers
generally pay nothing to join a class action, they must pay, on
average, $161 to file an arbitration claim. Moreover, “[c]onsumers
typically wait 150 days for a decision in arbitration, compared with
a typical wait of around 215 days for a conclusion in most class
actions.” That’s it – just a few months faster in exchange for owing
the bank $7,725. As to the banking industry’s claim of increased
consumer costs as a result of class action exposure, EPI explains
“[t]his claim is contradicted by real-life experience. Consumers
saw no increase in price after Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase,
Capital One, and HSBC dropped their arbitration clauses as a
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-tocongress-2015.pdf.
30
Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n, et al., to Richard Cordray, Chairman,
Bureau
of
Consumer
Financial
Prot.
(July
13,
2015),
https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/commentletters/Documents/cljointArbitration2015.pdf; see also Evan Weinberger, CFPB Arbitration Report
May
18,
2016,
Takes
Center
Stage
At
House
Hearing,
https://www.law360.com/articles/797403/cfpb-arbitration-report-takes-centerstage-at-house-hearing.
31
Heidi Shierholz, Correcting the record, Consumers fare better under class
actions than arbitration, Economic Policy Institute (Aug. 1, 2017),
http://www.epi.org/publication/correcting-the-record-consumers-fare-betterunder-class-actions-than-arbitration/.
32
According to the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), “the majority
of civil cases are consumer-debt-collection, landlord/tenant, small-claims, and
small-contract cases.” In other words, most civil cases involve the “little guy”
being sued, not suing. National Center For State Courts, Trends In State Courts
(2016),
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Trends%202016/Meeting-theChallenges.ashx.
33
Shierholz, supra note 31.
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result of court-approved settlements, and mortgage rates did not
increase after Congress banned forced arbitration in the mortgage
market. 34
In May 2016, the CFPB proposed a limited rule, 35 which
would allow defrauded individuals to file class actions against
banks, lenders, credit card companies and other financial
institutions that violate the law. Initially, the rule had clear bipartisan support, but its finalization was delayed until 2017 after
the election of a new Congress and Administration who were
hostile to the rule. 36 As a result, in 2017, congressional resolutions
were introduced in both Houses to permanently repeal the rule
under the Congressional Review Act (CRA). Resolutions to repeal
rules under the CRA require only majority votes, and cannot be
filibustered in the Senate. 37 In October 2017, the House voted to
block the rule. 38 The Senate soon followed in a vote so close that
Vice President Pence’s presence was needed to break a tie.
President Trump signed the rule’s repeal into law. 39

HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE ATTACKS ON RULE 23 AND
BEYOND
Soon after Rule 23 was amended in 1966, it became the
subject of legislative and judicial attacks by Republicans and
corporate-friendly lawmakers and judges. In their recent book

Rights
34

and Retrenchment,

The

Counterrevolution

against

Id.

Consumer Financial Prot. Bureau, 82 FR 33210, codified in 12 C.F.R. §
1040 (2017).
36
See Sylvan Lane, GOP polling firm: Bipartisan support for consumer
THE
HILL
(Oct.
5,
2017),
bureau
arbitration
rule,
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/354143-gop-polling-firm-finds-bipartisansupport-for-consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule.
35

Id.
See Sylvan Lane, GOP lawmakers introduce measures to repeal
consumer bureau arbitration rule, THE HILL (July 20, 2017),
37
38

https://thehill.com/policy/finance/342900-gop-lawmakers-introduce-measuresto-repeal-consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule; see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg,
Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-votewall-street-regulation.html.
39
Julia Horowitz, Trump kills rule that made it easier for people to sue
CNN
MONEY
(Nov.
1,
2017,
6:20
PM),
bank,
http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/01/news/trump-repeals-cfpb-arbitrationrule/index.html.
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Federal Litigation, Burbank and Farhang write:
[I]n the wake of an outpouring of rights-creating
legislation for the Democratic Congresses in the
1960s and 1970s, much of which contained
provisions
designed
to
stimulate
private
enforcement, the conservative legal movement
within the Republican Party – and more specifically,
within the first Reagan administration – devised a
response. Recognizing the political infeasibility of
retrenching substantive rights, the movement’s
strategy was to undermine the infrastructure for
enforcing them. 40
This included, among other things, attacks on class actions.
Large corporations opposed “the very concept of using class
actions to deter illegal conduct or prevent unjust enrichment.” 41
Bills were introduced through the 1980s, including one that would
make class actions unavailable for claims valued at less than $10. 42
The conservative legal movement that initiated these bills had a
friend in then Chief Justice Warren Burger. As Burbank and
Farhang note, Burger “made no secret of his antipathy toward the
‘litigation explosion.’” 43 In the 1970s, he “frequently spoke out
against what he and many others perceived as excessive ligation.” 44
His views “had normative weight, which seemed to increase in the
1980s, after the counterrevolution [against plaintiffs] became a
partisan [Republican] issue in the elected branches.” 45
Burger’s rhetoric about the “litigation explosions”
dovetailed perfectly with the “tort reform” movement at the state
level, which began in the mid-1970s and escalated in the mid1980. 46 The tort reform movement, however, was largely driven by
something completely different: rising liability insurance rates,
which evolved into a national “liability insurance crisis.” In the
mid-1970s and again in the mid-1980s, insurance companies hit
businesses and professional groups, such as doctors, with dramatic
40
41
42
43
44
45

BURBANK, supra note 2, at 3.

Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.

46
The movement to impair the ability of injured victims to obtain
compensation from the companies responsible for causing their injuries, is
commonly known as “tort reform.”
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increases in liability insurance premiums. Insurance companies
and their lobbyists claimed rate increases were due to a “litigation
explosion.” These assertions were false and lacked supporting
data. 47 The insurance industry had created this crisis through its
own mismanaged accounting and underwriting practices.
Nonetheless, insurance companies and other major special interest
groups argued to state lawmakers that the only way to bring rates
under control was to limit the legal rights of injured victims. 48
Many states legislatures succumbed to industry pressure.
Most notable was California, which enacted the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) in 1975. Among other things,
MICRA placed a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages for
malpractice victims. 49 In the early to mid-1980s, the “liability
insurance crisis” was broader and hit virtually every commercial
customer of liability insurance. This crisis was also manufactured
by the insurance industry, rather than being driven by litigation.
Insurance industry lobbying, however, led a large number of
additional states to enact limits on individuals’ legal rights during
this period. 50
As the insurance industry and special interest groups
continued to apply pressure on the states, a parallel “tort reform”
effort began at the federal level. In the early 1980s, anti-consumer
federal product liability legislation was introduced in Congress. 51
This legislation became a major civil justice focus for the business
community for several years. It was re-introduced in every
Congress throughout the 1980s. 52 In 1991, the Bush administration
tried to push the legislation forward by appointing a White House
Council on Competitiveness led by Vice President Dan Quayle.
This body embraced tort reform as a priority issue and assigned
See generally J. Robert Hunter and Joanne Doroshow, Premium Deceit
2016: The Failure of “Tort Reform” To Cut Insurance Prices, CTR. FOR JUSTICE
47

&
DEMOCRACY
(Nov.
2016),
http://centerjd.org/system/files/MasterPremiumDeceit2016F4.pdf.
48
Id.
49
See Cal. CIV. Code §3333.2 (West 2018).
50
Hunter & Dorshow, supra note 47.
51
See S. 2631, 97th Cong. (1981).
52
In 1983, Senator Bob Kasten (R-WI) reintroduced the bill as S. 44. In
1985, he reintroduced the bill again as S. 100. In June 1986, Senator John
Danforth (R-MO) introduced a modified version of the bill, S. 2760. This bill
was reported out of the Senate Commerce Committee, but it died later that year.
In 1987, Representative Bill Richardson (D-NM) introduced H.R. 1115, which
was reported out of committee but died in 1988. In 1989, Kasten introduced
similar bill, S. 1400, and in 1991, he introduced S. 640.
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Solicitor General Ken Starr the task of developing a plan to
overhaul the country’s civil liability laws. 53 Starr had represented
tobacco companies and General Motors, among other clients, in
products liability litigation. 54 In August 1991, the “Starr report,”
which presented 50 tort reform recommendations, was released.
The White House Council on Competitiveness alleged that the tort
reform recommendations were necessary to “maintain America’s
competitiveness.” 55 Then, in 1994, the issue exploded onto the
national scene with the Republican takeover of Congress and the
inclusion of tort reform in House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s
Contract with America. 56
While broad federal tort reform efforts ultimately failed,
smaller bills were enacted. In 1994, President Clinton signed into
law the General Aviation Revitalization Act, establishing an
eighteen-year statute of repose for general aviation aircraft. 57 In
1996, the Republican Congress actually passed the product
liability bill; although President Clinton vetoed the bill, Congress
responded by passing another bill that was far more limited. 58
President Clinton did sign the second bill which immunized from
liability most suppliers of “raw materials” and “components” used
in the manufacture of medical implants. 59
During this period, Congress also began focusing on
investor protection class actions. In the 1990s, Congress passed the
See Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in the United States, reprinted at 60
U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 1005 (1992).
54
See, e.g., Keith Hammond & Suzie Larsen, Starr Helped GM Cover Up
Possible Perjury, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 27, 1998, 8:00 AM),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/02/starr-helped-gm-cover-possibleperjury/; see also Robert Scheer, Setting Fire to Tobacco Legislation L.A.TIMES
(July 28, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jul/28/local/me-7795.
55
Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in the United States, supra note 53
(Among the major recommendations were: caps on punitive damages and
instituting a “loser pays” rule, as well as various rules to discourage litigation).
56
See Neil A. Lewis, HOUSE G.O.P. QUITS TORT REFORM PLAN,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/07/us/house-gopquits-tort-reform-plan.html.
57
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108
Stat. 1552 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §40101).
58
John F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes Product Liability Measure, WASH. POST
(May
3,
1996),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/05/03/clinton-vetoesproduct-liability-measure/cf8e0f50-cc01-41b7-9e881a2c6d6dd01c/?utm_term=.08a952fc9091.
59
William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Biomaterials Access
Assurance Act of 1998, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 13, 1998),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=54777.
53
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Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 60 and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). 61
The PSLRA and SLUSRA hinder the process for bringing
securities fraud class actions and force class actions based on state
law fraud into federal court. As with the products liability bill,
President Clinton vetoed the PSLRA but this time, his veto was
overridden and the bill became law. 62 Clinton then signed the
SLUSA.
The last major congressional change to class action law
came in 2005 when Congress passed the so-called “Class Action
Fairness Act” (CAFA) after years of lobbying pressure from the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce,. 63 This law provides corporations
with the authority to decide, in most cases, which court will hear a
class action case that accuses them of wrongdoing. Specifically,
CAFA makes it easier for defendants in state class actions to
remove cases to the much smaller and already clogged federal
court system, 64 a system that is generally more favorable to
defendants. 65
CAFA was opposed by virtually every consumer,
environmental, and civil rights group, as well as state Attorneys
General. 66 Civil rights groups argued that the law would cause
federal courts to be overburdened with state court cases, causing

60

(1995).

Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737

61
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
62
U.S.
SENATE,
WILLIAM
J.
CLINTON,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/Presidents/ClintonW.pdf.
63
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2018) (According to CAFA, defendants in class
actions that involve more than $5 million when any class member resides in a
different state than any defendant (unless two thirds of the class and the primary
defendants are in the state where the case was originally filed) can remove them
to federal court).
64
The federal system has often struggled with budget cuts. See e.g. Todd
Ruger, Sequestration Outlook Bleak for Federal Courts, NAT’L L. J., (2013),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202591488315.
65
Several years before CAFA was enacted, the late Cornell University Law
Professor Theodore Eisenberg demonstrated “that removals of cases from state
to federal courts greatly improved defendants’ chances [and] concluded that the
federal forums were ‘more favorable [to defendants] in terms of biases and
inconveniences.” Terry Carter, A Step Up In Class, ABA JOURNAL (May 1,
2008), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_step_up_in_class/.
66
Amanda Griscom Little, Erin Brockovich, Drop Dead, SALON (Feb. 12,
2005, 9:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2005/02/12/class_action/.
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civil rights cases to be unfairly pushed out of federal court. 67
Evidence suggests their fears may have been valid; federal court
judges are often unable to deal with the increased caseloads, and
are bouncing meritorious cases out of court. 68 Given that these
federal judges are “hamstrung by the increased attention to state
law that these cases require,” 69 with no guidance on how to proceed
with multiple state laws in play, it may be no surprise that some
judges are reluctant to grant class certification. As one practitioner
testified before the House Judiciary Committee in 2012:
Worse yet, these certification refusals deny
American citizens their Constitutional guarantee to
a day in court and the opportunity to have their
claims adjudicated. If consumers must band
together in a class action to seek redress for their
injuries, because any single individual’s claim is too
small to justify the costs of litigation, and if such
class actions can only proceed in federal courts that
will not certify their claims, the courthouse doors
effectively close, leaving consumers with no
remedy. 70
While some detrimental laws have gone into effect,
Congress has been reluctant to enact broad legislation that strips
away the legal rights of Americans despite the desires of the U.S.
Chamber of Congress. One reason may be what Burbank and
Farhang describe as “negativity bias” which, they say:

Thomas Henderson, Chief Counsel and Senior Deputy for the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights, testified against CAFA noting it “would tear cases
from state judicial systems, equipped with thousands and thousands of judges,
who administer the laws involved on a daily basis, and thrust them on a
relatively tiny federal judiciary that is not equipped to handle them and is illequipped even to handle the volume and complexity of cases now on its docket.
In the end, access to the federal courts and to the class action device to secure
justice in matters where truly federal issues are at stake will be casualties of this
legislation.” Class Action Litigation: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary
U.S. S., 107th Cong. 120 (2002) (testimony of Thomas Henderson, Chief Counsel
and Senior Deputy, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights).
67

Class Actions Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. H.R.,
68

112th Cong. 6 (2012) (testimony of Thomas M. Sobol, Partner, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP).
69
Id. at 7.
70
Id. at 6.
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“leads people to be substantially more likely to
mobilize to avoid the imposition of losses of existing
rights and interests as compared to securing new
ones. It also leads voters to be more likely to punish
politicians who have impaired their interests than to
reward politicians who have benefited them, and
politicians know this.” 71
For “negativity bias” to work, however, the public must first note
and be aware of Congress’ actions. Business lobbyists, on the other
hand, appear to hope the public remains oblivious.

AMENDING RULE 23 WITH H.R. 985
In enacting the Rules Enabling Act, Congress directed the
U.S. Supreme Court to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure for the federal courts. 72 Over the last few years, the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
undertook a long, thorough, and deliberative process by which it
considered and implemented bipartisan changes to Rule 23. These
changes will go into effect December 2018. 73 By choosing to amend
Rule 23 with federal legislation– let alone take a sledgehammer to
the rule– Congress decided to circumvent the process it established
for the promulgation of federal rules.
The “Fairness in Class Action Litigation” bill was first
introduced in 2015. It was known as H.R. 1927. At that time, the
bill contained one main provision: a change to Rule 23’s
commonality prerequisite with a new requirement that every class
member have “an injury of the same type and scope.” 74 Moreover,
proof of the same “scope” of injury must be established before the
case could even proceed as a class. In a letter to the House leaders,
consumer, civil rights, labor, environmental, and many other
BURBANK, supra note 2, at 51.
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1934).
73
See e.g. Ryan DiClemente, Are Significant Changes To Class Actions On
The Horizon? (Part Two), INSIDE ARM, (June 29, 2017),
https://www.insidearm.com/news/00043061-are-significant-changes-classactions-hor/.
74
The word “scope” replaced the word “extent” found in the bill’s earlier
version, but this was a distinction without a difference. See e.g., Letter from
Groups to Speaker Paul Ryan and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, U.S. House
of
Representatives
(Jan.
7,
2016),
https://centerjd.org/system/files/H.R.1927classactionletterF2.pdf
71
72
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public interest organization described how this provision would be
fatal to most class actions. Classes inherently include a broad range
of affected individuals that virtually never suffer the same “scope”
of injury from the same wrongdoing. 75 As the groups wrote, cases,
in addition to most civil rights and employment discrimination
cases, that could not meet such a standard include:
[R]ecent successful class actions brought over bank
and credit card abuses, where the same corporate
policy resulted in customers being cheated out of
various amounts of money; home and mortgage loan
abuses; antitrust violations, where class actions have
recovered millions for small businesses in varying
amounts from illegal price-fixing cartels; illegal forprofit colleges practices; refusals by companies to
properly pay workers; many types of product
defects; and denial of insurance benefits. Business
owners financially injured by the BP oil spill all had
different losses but all were financially injured by
the same corporate misconduct. Many more
examples could be cited.
It is for these reasons that federal courts have
rejected such a “commonality in damages”
requirement for class certification. As Judge Posner
explained,
a
“commonality
in
damages”
requirement:
[W]ould drive a stake through the heart of the class
action device. . . [T]he fact that damages are not
identical across all class members should not
preclude class certification. Otherwise defendants
would be able to escape liability for tortious harms
of enormous aggregate magnitude but so widely
distributed as not to be remediable in individual
Id.; see Letter from Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Charles H. Kirbo Chair
of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, to James J. Park, Chief Counsel,
Democratic Staff, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice,
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Feb. 13, 2017),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/burch-final-comments-on-fairness-inclass-action-litigation-act-1.pdf (citing Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.
Ct. 1036, 1049-50 (2016)) (notably, as recently as 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court
has “said that parties should be able to enjoy the benefits of class actions even
when damages vary.”).
75
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suits. 76
When H.R. 1927 was up for a vote on the House floor, it
was combined with another bill that limited the rights of asbestos
victims, becoming the “Fairness in Class Action Litigation and
Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2015.” By a vote
of 211– 188, the Fairness in Class Action Ligitation and Furthering
Asbestos Claim Transparency Act passed the House on January 8,
2016 without bi-partisan support 77 and with 16 Republicans
voting against it.
Undeterred by what might be considered a politically-weak
vote, House leaders in the next Congress decided to re-introduce
the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act. But there were
changes from the previous bill. The legislation had a new bill
number, H.R. 985, as well as 10 pages of brand new provisions. 78
Among them was one that would prevent class certification if any
class representative was “a present or former client of” class
counsel. This bizarre clause would directly interfere with the right
to contract, denying people the freedom to choose their own
attorney while permitting corporate defendants to repeatedly use
the same attorneys. The bill also creates impossible limits on
plaintiffs’ attorneys fees, preventing plaintiff attorneys from being
paid anything until all monetary recovery has been paid to class
members, with no concern whatsoever that some settlements take
years to distribute. By way of example, in the recent NFL
Concussion class action brought by former NFL players suffering
traumatic brain injury, the settlement process will take 65 years. 79
In other words, such a restriction would chill firms from even
bringing even meritorious cases like this. It would also deprive
76
Letter from Groups to Speaker Paul Ryan and Minority Leader Nancy
Pelosi,
U.S.
House
of
Representatives,
(Jan.
7,
2016),
https://centerjd.org/system/files/H.R.1927classactionletterF2.pdf.
77
“Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim
Transparency:
Roll
Vote
No.
33”
211:16
(Jan.
8,
2016),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll033.xml.
78
See, e.g., Alison Frankel, The most intriguing idea in House Republicans’
REUTERS,
(Feb.
13,
2017),
bill
to
gut
class
actions,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-classaction/the-most-intriguing-idea-inhouse-republicans-bill-to-gut-class-actions-idUSKBN15S2GR.
79
Letter from Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Charles H. Kirbo Chair of Law,
University of Georgia School of Law, to James J. Park, Chief Counsel,
Democratic Staff, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice,
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Feb. 13, 2017),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/burch-final-comments-on-fairness-inclass-action-litigation-act-1.pdf
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courts of any flexibility to make their own considered fee decisions.
It would amend Rule 23’s “acertainability” requirement in
a way that “has been rejected [by] most circuits . . . as well as by
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.” 80 Specifically, the bill
would prohibit class actions from proceeding where the exact
membership of a class may be difficult to determine. This will
result in the denial of small claim consumer classes, whose
members are inherently difficult to identify. For example,
thousands of consumers may have been fraudulently overcharged
on the retail price of a product but stores would have no records of
customers’ names and purchasers would be unlikely to maintain
proofs of purchase. As a result, corporations engaged in fraud or
misconduct will be “released from liability regardless of how strong
the evidence of wrongdoing might be.” 81
An additional section would abolish issue classes under
Rule 23(b)(4). This provision “contradicts every current circuit
court decision to date” as well as the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules 82 As Cardozo School of Law professor Myriam Gilles wrote
in her letter to the House Judiciary committee, 83
Issue classes are critically important vehicles in
cases where it would be unfair to the defendant to
allow damages to be determined on a class-wide
basis.. . . Under Rule 23(c)(4) ¬ the court may
bifurcate proceedings. It can certify an issues class
on liability, and leave damages to individual
proceedings in which the defendant may examine
each plaintiff. . . . The proposed legislation would
abolish such issue classes.
Other sections would directly interfere with judges’ ability
to sensibly manage a case. For example, as Fordham Law
Professor Howard Erichson described in his letter to the House
Judiciary Committee, the bill 84
80
81
82

Id.
Id.
Id.

83
Letter from Myriam Gilles, Vice Dean, Paul R. Verkuil Research Chair
and Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law to James J. Park, Chief Counsel,
Democratic Staff, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice,
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, (Feb. 13, 2017),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/gilles-letter-to-james-park-on-hr-9851.pdf.
84
Letter from Howard M. Erichson, Professor of Law, Fordham University
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. . . would require a stay of discovery pending any of
a wide variety of motions. Congress should let
judges do their job. Judges are charged with
exercising discretion to rule on stay motions, and the
most efficient answer varies depending on context.
It makes no sense to impose this as an across-theboard requirement. Worse, this provision would
encourage defendants to file frivolous motions in
order to get the benefit of the automatic discovery
stay. This would increase the cost of litigation for
other parties and for the courts.
Another section would burden Courts of Appeals by
requiring them to allow appeals from any order granting or
denying a class certification motion, even if such motions are
frivolous. Courts of Appeals, however, already have discretion to
hear such appeals when it is appropriate. As a result, there is no
reason for this provision.
There are a number of other sections of this bill that deal
with mass tort cases and multidistrict litigation, which are beyond
the scope of this article. They are all severely problematic. They
would knock many injured victims out of court, force cases into
federal court, burden appellate courts, and impose unfair and
arbitrary limits on attorneys’ fees.
Although the House Judiciary Committee majority tried to
ram the bill through committee in order to quash the chance of
opposition building against the legislation, opponents responded in
record time. Because of its reckless intrusion into the federal rules
process, the bill garnered immediate opposition from the Judicial
Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Chaired by Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure responded to
the House Judiciary Committee, “strongly urg[ing]” Congress not
to proceed on this legislation. 85 The American Bar Association
School of Law, to Hon. Paul Ryan, Speaker, et al., (Feb. 18, 2017),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/erichson-hr985-letter-3.pdf.
85
Letter from the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States to the Honorable Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, (Feb.
14,
2017),
http://disabilityrightslaw.org/sites/default/files/documents/Impact_Fund-HR985_JudicialConference-Letter.pdf.
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attacked the bill on this basis, as well. 86 And as Reuters’ Allison
Frankel wrote a few days after the bill’s introduction:
Democrats in the House Judiciary Committee have
already begun to push back against the bill,
contacting class and mass litigation scholars for their
analysis of Goodlatte’s suggestions. At least two
leading class action law profs - Myriam Gilles of
Cardozo [who called the bill “partisan, kill-all-classactions bill,”] and Elizabeth Burch of the University
of Georgia - have submitted comments. 87
Despite their valuable analysis, these comments were not
allowed into the record of the House Judiciary Committee
proceeding. On February 15, 2017, less than a week after it was
introduced, H.R. 985 was marked up and voted out the House
Judiciary Committee on a party-line 19 to 2 vote and sent to the
House floor. 88 As with the last Congress’ H.R. 1927, this bill was
combined with other legislation that limited the rights of asbestos
victims, becoming the “Fairness in Class Action Litigation and
Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017.” It passed
the House on March 9, 2017 by a close 220 to 201 vote. 89 As with
H.R. 1927, it passed with no bi-partisan support and with 14
Republicans voting against it. 90 It now sits in the Senate Judiciary
Committee, awaiting action that might never come. 91
86
Letter from Thomas M. Susman. Director, Governmental Affairs Office.
American Bar Association, to the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2017Feb1
4_ClassActions_L.authcheckdam.pdf.
87
Alison Frankel, The most intriguing idea in House Republicans’ bill to
gut class actions, REUTERS, (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usotc-classaction/the-most-intriguing-idea-in-house-republicans-bill-to-gut-classactions-idUSKBN15S2GR.
88
U.S House Committee on the Judiciary, Authorization and Oversight
Plan;
H.R.
985;
H.R.
906,
(Feb.
15,
2017),
https://judiciary.house.gov/markup/authorization-oversight-plan-h-r-985-h-r906/.
89
“Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act: Roll Vote No. 148” 220:201 (Mar
9, 2017), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll148.xml.
90
“Fairness in Class Action Ligitation and Furthering Asbestos Claim
Transparency:
Roll
Vote
No.
33”
211:16
(Jan.
8,
2016),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll033.xml.
91
See Bruce Kaufman, Business-Friendly Litigation Overhaul Stalls in
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(July
27,
2017),
Senate,
https://www.bna.com/businessfriendly-litigation-overhaul-n73014462386/.
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WHY H.R. 985? POLITICS AND MONEY
While it might have felt that a monstrous bill like H.R. 985
came out of nowhere, it represented decades of corporate lobbyists’
efforts. Since the 1970s, class actions have had a target on their
back as major corporate lobbies and conservative legal
organizations have sought to eliminate them. During this time,
Congress and the Supreme Court have significantly reduced
plantiffs’ access to them. Class actions, a powerful tool for justice
for many victims of wrongdoing, remain in jeopardy.
In 2017, Republican control of both Houses of Congress and
the White House had initially filled class action opponents with
hopeful prospects that Congress might finally destroy class actions.
In the words of top tort reform lobbyist Victor Schwartz, “[t]he
‘clouds are finally parting.” 92 Schwartz made these remarks to
Bloomberg/BNA reporter, Bruce Kaufman, who wrote several
articles quoting key players in the legislative fight over a series of
new anti-civil justice bills introduced in early 2017, including H.R.
985. 93 In February 2017, after the bills had been reported out of
the House Judiciary Committee but before the March 2017 floor
votes, Kaufman wrote:
The “fast-track” approach is important, said Victor
E. Schwartz .. . . “It gets things done early before
they get too politicized,” he told Bloomberg BNA.
All House Republicans have promised to support
the litigation overhaul measures in [Speaker Paul
Ryan’s] “A Better Way,” Schwartz said.. . .
[Lisa A. Rickard, president of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform] said, early
action by the House Judiciary Committee “signals
Bruce Kaufman, Trump to Weigh Litigation Changes Long Coveted by
Business, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.bna.com/eyes-trump92

probiz-n57982084448/.
93
See Bruce Kaufman, Trump Seen as Supportive of Business-Backed
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(Mar.
2,
2017),
Litigation
Bills,
https://www.bna.com/trump-seen-supportive-n57982084705/; see also Bruce
Kaufman, Push to Enact Civil Justice Bills Follows Industry Playbook,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.bna.com/push-enact-civiln57982084551/; see also Kaufman, supra note 91.
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that Congress recognizes the need for urgent action
on legal reform” and that the issue will receive
“priority consideration this year.” 94
But they were wrong. Following close House votes on all of
the Chamber’s anti-civil justice bills, including H.R. 985,
Kaufman promptly responded by stating “[t]he strategy was to
fast-track legislation through the House, to give the bills more time
to advance in the more deliberative Senate. . .Today, those plans
appear to be in disarray.” 95
Unsurprisingly, the bill had strong opposition from
consumer, civil rights and other public interest groups. 96 But the
strength of conservative opposition to H.R. 985 was an unexpected
factor that may have had some impact on the vote. In a move that
surprised many, the conservative House Liberty Caucus wrote a
letter to the House supporting class actions and opposing H.R. 985,
noting:
Class action lawsuits are a market - based solution
Bruce Kaufman, Push to Enact Civil Justice Bills Follows Industry
Playbook, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.bna.com/push94

enact-civil-n57982084551/.
95
Kaufman, supra note 91.
96

Bill,

Group Letter to U.S. House of Representatives Opposing Class Action

Center
for
Justice
and
Democracy
(Mar.
8,
2017),
https://centerjd.org/content/group-letter-us-house-representatives-opposingclass-action-bill (In their letter to the House Judiciary Committee, over 50
organizations opposing the bill, began by telling committee members, “[l]ike last
year’s legislation (H.R. 1927), the bill begins with the requirement that every
person in a class have ‘an injury of the same type and scope’ before the case can
proceed. This alone would sound the death knell for most class
actions. . . .[b]ut . . . that’s just the beginning of what’s wrong with this
appalling piece of legislation.”); see also Letter from Civil Rights Groups to
Speaker Paul Ryan and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, U.S. House of
Representatives
(Mar.
7,
2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559b2478e4b05d22b1e75b2d/t/58bf37c73
e00be8bb74c3dd8/1488926663702/HR985+Ryan+Pelosi.pdf (in their letter to
the House, 123 civil rights organizations and advocates wrote, “[T]he bill’s
limitation on ‘issue classes’ will impede the enforcement of civil rights laws.
Under current practice, the district court will decide in some cases that the best
approach is to resolve the illegality of a discriminatory practice in an initial
proceeding, and then allow class members to pursue individual remedies on
their own. In such cases, class certification for the core question of liability
(often a complex proceeding) will be tried and resolved just once for the benefit
of the many affected individuals. These issue classes can promote both
efficiency and fairness. [H.R. 985], however, would deprive courts of this ability
that they currently have to manage class actions to ensure justice.”).
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for addressing widespread breaches of contract,
violations of property rights, and infringements of
other legal rights. They are a preferable alternative
to government regulation because they impose
damages only on bad actors rather than imposing
compliance costs on entire industries. They also help
the judiciary by consolidating a multitude of similar
cases, which decreases burdens on the already
clogged court system. 97
As consumer advocate and bill opponent, Pamela Gilbert,
told Kaufman, “[t]he growing unease that many Republicans feel
about blocking access to the courts is very interesting and it isn’t
something we have seen for many years.” 98 The Chamber is hardly
giving up, however, telling Kaufman, “[w]e’re realistic. We believe
there’s a path forward for legal reform in this Congress, and are
doing everything we can to advance our priorities.” 99 Indeed, that’s
where the money comes in.

THE MONEY
In 1998, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce created its
Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) to pursue the Chamber’s national
anti-civil justice, tort reform agenda. Even when considered
separately from the massive lobbying muscle of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, ILR now constitutes one of the largest federal
lobbying forces in the nation. In 2017, ILR spent $23 million
lobbying; the Chamber spent $82 million. 100 Over the last decade,
ILR, which opposes the American Association for Justice (AAJ)’s
position on generally the same portfolio of bills including H.R. 985,
spent over $260 million lobbying Congress. 101 That amount, $260
million, is more than five times the amount spent by AAJ during

House Liberty Caucus (@libertycaucus), TWITTER (Mar. 9, 2017, 2:32
PM), https://twitter.com/libertycaucus/status/839967179495837696.
98
Kaufman, supra note 91, at 14.
99
Id.
100
See US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, OPENSECRETS: CENTER
FOR
RESPONSIVE
POLITICS
(Apr.
24,
2018),
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/firmsum.php?id=D000022405&year=2017.
101
See Top Spenders, OPENSECRETS: CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS
(2018),
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=2017&indexType=s,.
97
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the same time period. 102
With respect to H.R. 985, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s
lobbying reports greatly outnumber those of entities lobbying
against it. 103 In 2017, it filed 32 lobbying reports, which is twice the
number of those filed by its closest competitor, AAJ. 104 Further,
ILR’s massive expenditures on H.R. 985 were supplemented by
lobbying money from industries that would directly benefit from
class action limits, including insurance, chemical, tobacco,
financial, consumer product, drug, and telecommunications. 105
Yet, what did it buy them?
H.R. 985 barely made it out of the House of
Representatives. Never had opposition to federal tort reform
legislation been so sharp from House conservatives. The legislation
passed the House with no bi-partisan support. 106 As of publication,
there is no sign of any Senate action.

CONCLUSION
House Republicans who voted “yes” on H.R. 985 in March
2017, did so with the knowledge that voters did not send them to
Washington DC to pass laws blocking constituents’ ability to
access the courts or file class actions. Yet many on Capitol Hill are
beholden to major industry groups, like the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, which want Congress to do just that.
At the beginning of the 115th Congress in 2017, with
Republicans in control of the executive and legislative branches of
government, it seemed like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce might
get its wish – federal legislation to decimate class actions in the
United States. At least so far, they have failed; perhaps they did
not factor in conservative opposition to their bill, or perhaps they
know this is not a politically popular bill.
However, there is no reason to believe industry groups have
given up. Corporate lobbyists have already poured many millions
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of dollars into lobbying efforts to eviserate class actions. With huge
sums of lobbying money still at their disposal, there will be fresh
opportunities to buy influence once a new Congress begins in 2019.
Industry lobbyists want results. Based on the sheer strength
of their lobbying muscle, they may eventually get their wish. The
only way to stop them is for the public to push back, and to let
public officials know that their class action rights must be
protected. The real question is whether anyone is paying attention.

